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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE.

This is an appeal of the District Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
Defendants/Respondents the Estate of Mary Steele ("Mary Steele") and Amber Steele.

The

judgment dismissed Plaintiffs/Appellants Stephen Boswell's and Karena Boswell's ("Boswells")
claims for strict liability, negligence, negligence per se and premises liability claims. Mr. Boswell
was Mary Steele's son-in-law 1 and Karena Steele her daughter. Amber Steele is Mary Steele's
granddaughter and Karena Boswell's niece.

The Boswells' claims stemmed from an incident

involving Amber Steele's dog Zoey.
After a social gathering at the Boswells' home, Mr. Boswell drove Mary Steele home. When
Mr. Boswell entered the home, he saw Zoey, who was completely enclosed behind a gate in the
kitchen. Zoey was also barking and growling, yet despite this, Mr. Boswell approached Zoey, with
a closed fit, reached over the gate and was bitten.
The District Court c01Tectly concluded there was no genuine issue of material fact that Idaho
has never adopted strict liability as to dog bite cases; that there was no genuine issue of material fact
that Mary Steele and Amber Steele were neither negligent nor negligent per se, as there was no
evidence that they owed any duty to the Mr. Boswell or even if they had that they breached any duty;
that there was no genuine issue of material fact that under the premises liability claim, Mr. Boswell
was a social guest-licensee, not an invitee; and that there was no genuine issue of material fact that

Mary Steele passed away subsequent to the filing of the Boswells' complaint.
RESPONDENTS BRIEF ON APPEAL· PAGE 1

Zoey was not dangerous.
B.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW.

On September 24, 2012, the Boswells filed their initial complaint, asserting negligence,
unreasonable risks, negligence per se pursuant to Idaho Code §25-2805, and premises liability. R.,
pp. 14-18. Mary Steele and Amber Steele filed their answer denying any liability. R., pp. 20-23.
Subsequent thereto, on December 24, 2012, the Boswells filed a motion to amend their
complaint, to which Mary Steele and Amber Steele objected, to add claims for strict liability and
negligence per se under the Pocatello City Code related to dog bites. R., pp. 39-48; 49-72; 103-105.
On April 10, 2014, the District Comi granted the Boswells' motion, and set the matter for trial. R.,
pp. 143-153. The Boswells filed an Amended Complaint, as well as a motion for partial summary
judgment, asse1iing there was no genuine issue of fact that Mary Steele and Amber Steele were
strictly liable, that Mr. Boswell was an invitee, and that Mary and Amber Steele's affinnative
defense of comparative fault was inapplicable. R., pp. 73-87; 125-133; 331-349; 409-412.
On July 12, 2013, Mary Steele and Amber Steele filed their motion for summary judgment,
asserting there was no genuine issue of material fact that Idaho did not allow for strict liability in dog
bite cases; that they owed no duty to the Boswells; that even if a duty were owed, they did not breach
that duty; and that they were not negligent or negligent per se. R., pp. 160-242. Also, on July 16,
2013, a hearing was held on Mary Steele's and Amber Steele's motion to quash the deposition
subpoenaofJohn Billquist, an adjuster for Mary Steele's and Amber Steele's insurance carrier, State
Fann. R., 245. Mary Steele and Amber Steele asse1ied that the Boswells were not allowed to depose
RESPONDENTS BRIEF ON APPEAL - PAGE 2

Mr. Billquist, as he was an adjuster for State Fann, and his actions were protected under the work
product privilege, as well as the fact that the responsive letter he sent to the Boswells' counsel's
settlement demand letter was protected under Idaho Rule of Evidence 408. Tr., p.2, 1.2-p. 3, 1.9; p.
8, 1.24-p.9, 1.18. The District Comi granted the motion and quashed the subpoena. R., p. 245. Tr.,
p. 10, 11.12-21.
Mary Steele and Amber Steele opposed the Boswells' motion for partial summary judgment,
and filed motions to strike the Affidavits of Mr. Boswell, Mrs. Boswell and Tamara Andersen, a
City of Pocatello Animal Control officer who responded to the dog bite. R., pp. 247-309; 350-353.
The Boswells filed a memorandum and affidavits in opposition to Mary Steele's and Amber Steele's
motion for summary judgment and in opposition to the motion to strike affidavits. R., pp. 310327;413-428.
On August 5, 2013, a hearing was held on the parties' respective motions for summary
judgment and motions to strike. R., p. 454. On October 30, 2013, the District Court issued its
Memorandum Decision & Order granting Mary Steele's and Amber Steele's motion for summary
judgment and motion to strike the Tamara Andersen affidavit. R., pp. 455-466. Thereafter, on
January 21, 2014, a hearing was held on the Boswells' motion for reconsider. R., p. 481. On
February 25, 2014, the District Court filed its memorandum decision denying the Boswells' motion
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to reconsider. R., pp. 483-488. The District Court then entered the Final Judgement on March 14,
2014. R., p. 489. The Boswells appealed.
C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.

1.

Mary Steele put up "Beware of Dog" signs to the gates of her property. R., p. 187

(Mary Steele Deposition Transcript p. 17, 11.20-23).
2.

Mary Steele and Amber Steele did not know that Zoey was dangerous 2 or vicious,3

or that she would bite Mr. Boswell. R., pp.185-86(Mary Steele Depo. p.12, 11.5-13; p. 13, 11. 10-15).
Prior to the incident on October 8, 2011, there had been no complaints or any adjudication thatZoey
was dangerous or had bitten anyone without provocation. 4 Zoey nipped at a friend of Amber Steele's,
Chris Kettler, but only because Zoey saw Ms. Kettler reach or move towards Amber Steele and was
being protective of her. R., pp. 71-72. Also, prior to the incident, Mary Steele never saw Zoey bare

2

Under Pocateilo City Code 6.04.0lOA, Band C define "dangerous" as an "animal which, when
unprovoked by teasing, taunting or a threatening manner by an person approaches said person in
an apparent attitude of attack .... or any animal with a known propensity, tendency or disposition
to attack unprovoked ... or any animal which bites, inflicts injury, assaults or otherwise attacks a
human being ... without justifiable provocation[.]"[Emphasis supplied].
3Idaho

Code §25-2805 defines vicious as a dog, "which, when not physically provoked,
physically attacks, wounds, bites or otherwise injures any person who is not trespassing.... "
[Emphasis supplied].
4

This is required under Pocatello City Code 6.04.050A. Also, under Idaho Code §25-28-5(2) a person
is guilty of owning a vicious dog where it is established the dog bites or injures a person, "when not
physically provoked[.]"[Emphasis supplied].
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her teeth. R., p. 189 (Mary Steele Depo. p. 26, 11.2-3).
3.

Mary Steele had a fenced-in backyard to keep Zoeyonherprope1iy. ld.,p. 11, ll.5-9.

4.

Zoey was owned by Amber Steele, who kept Zoey in the basement almost every day

and all day long. R., p.229 (Karena Boswell Deposition, pp. 7-8).
5.

Mr. Boswell was well acquainted with Zoey prior to the incident. R., p.214 (Stephen

Boswell Deposition p. 12, 11. 7-14). Zoey let Mr. Boswell pet her before and he held her on his lap
and she showed him affection. R., 189-90 (Mary Steele Depo. p. 26, 1.20-p. 27,1.1).
6.

On the date of the incident, Mr. Boswell picked up Mary Steele to take her to his and

Mrs. Boswell's home for a family gathering. R., p.184 (Mary Steele Depo. p. 6, 11. 17-20; R., p. 217
(Stephen Boswell Depo., p. 23, 1.17-p.24, 1.23). Amber Steele was not at Mary Steele's home at the
time Mary and Mr. Boswell were there. R., p. 190 (Mary Steele Depo. p. 32, 11.8-1 O; R., 221
(Stephen Boswell Depo. p. 37, 1.10-12; R., p. 235 (Karena Boswell Depo. p. 30, 11.6-8).
7.

Before Mary Steele left her home, she placed Zoeybehind a gate in the kitchen of her

home, and Zoey was completely confined, and not loose, when she and Mr. Boswell returned. Rp.
184 (Maiy Steele Depo. p. 7, 1.2-p. 8, 1.18); R,pp. 208-209; R., 514, Exhibits 1-4. Zoey was confined
and penned in behind the gate and in an area she was supposed to be. R., l 86(Mary Steele Depo.
p. 14, 11.3-13; R., 192 (Ma1y Steele Depo. p. 40, 11. 10-13),·R., 514, Exhibits 1-4.
8.

When Mr. Boswell and Mmy Steele returned, they entered Mary's home, and, prior

to the bite, Zoey was barking and growling. R., 184 (Maiy Steele Depo. p. 6, 11. 21-25).
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9.

Mr. Boswell, on his own, and without Mary Steele's knowledge or at her request,

approached Zoey, who was behind the gate, with his right hand in a closed fist. R., 219-20
(Stephen Boswell Depo. p. 29, 1.7-p. 33, 1.5)(emphasis supplied). Mr. Boswell reached to Zoey and
she bit him.
10.

Mr. Boswell admitted that there was no reason for him to go beyond the gate, and that

Mary never asked him to go to Zoey, and he decided on his own to go to Zoey. R., p.185 & 192
(Mary Steele Depo. p. 12; p. 40, 11. 14-18; R., 218 (Stephen Boswell Depo. p. 25, 11.22-24).
11.

The Boswells both admitted that they knew that Mary Steele and Amber Steele kept

Zoey in the basement, and did not think Mary Steele did anything wrong in keeping Zoey in a fenced
in back yard or behind the gate in her house. R., p.215 ( Stephen Boswell Depo. p. 13, 11. 6-7; p. 16,
11.11-19; R., p. 232 & 238 (Karena Boswell Depo. p. 19, 11.2-6; p. 42, 1.10-p. 43, 1.3). Even more
telling is that Mr. Boswell admitted he did not believe Mary Steele was negligent, as he testified, "I

don't think she [Mary] did anything wrong." R., 220 (Stephen Boswell Depo. p. 35, 1.25-p.35,
l.l)(emphasis supplied). Mrs. Boswell admitted while she was around Zoey she and did not have
any concerns. R., p.232 (Karena Boswell Depo. p. 17, 11.19-23). Mrs. Boswell also admitted she
could not say Mary Steele's or Amber Steele's leaving Zoey in the kitchen behind the gate was an
act of negligence, actually thought it was reasonable to keep a gate/banier to keep the dogs
se6,regated, and could not be critical of Mary Steele in her actions. R., p. 237 (Karena Boswell Depo.
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p. 42, 1.1 0-p.43, 1.3). Mrs. Boswell also could not say whether the bite was unpredictable or not to
Mary or Amber. R., p. 23 5 (Karena Boswell Depo. p. 3 3, 11. 1-8).
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL

1.

Did the District Comi c01Tectly grant summary judgment in concluding that Idaho

has never adopted strict liability in dog bite cases?
2.

Did the District Court conectly conclude there was no genuine issue of material fact

that Mary Steele and Amber Steele were not negligent, as they owed no duty to Mr. Boswell, where
they did not have any knowledge or notice that Zoey was a dangerous or vicious animal, where they
kept Zoey completely enclosed behind a gate in the kitchen of the home, and where Mr. Boswell
approached Zoey, who was barking and growling, with a closed fist?
3.

Did the District Court conectly conclude that there was no genuine issue of material

fact that neither Mary Steele nor Amber Steele had knowledge or notice that Zoey was a dangerous
or vicious animal, where she was completely enclosed behind a gate in the kitchen of the home and
where Mr. Boswell approached Zoey, who was barking and growling, with a closed fist?
4.

Did the District Comi conectly conclude that there was no genuine issue of material

fact that Mr. Boswell was a social guest/licensee, that Mary Steele did not owe a duty to Mr.
Boswell, and even if she had, that there was no genuine issue of material fact that Mary Steele
breached any duty, where Zoey was completely enclosed behind a gate in the kitchen of the home,
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where Mr. Boswell did not consider Zoey to be dangerous or vicious, and where Mr. Boswell
approached Zoey, who was barking and growling, with a closed fist?
5.

Did the District Court correctly strike the Affidavit of Tamara Andersen, pursuant

to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e), where Ms. Andersen's affidavit was conclusory, lacked
foundation and based on pure speculation?
6.

Did the District Court correctly grant the motion to quash the deposition subpoena

of John Billquist, where there was no evidence that neither the attorney-client nor work product
p1ivileges were waived?
7.

Are Amber Steele and Mary Steele entitled to attorney's fees and costs on appeal,

pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121 and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41?

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 56( c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment "shall be
rendered if the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving paiiy is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.'" Smith v. Meridian Joint School Dist. No. 2, 128 Idaho 714,718,918
P.2d 583,587 (1996) (quoting I.R.C.P. 56(c)); see also Avila v. Wahlquist, 126 Idaho 745,890 P.2d
331 (1995). In making this detennination, a court should liberally construe the record in favor of
the pmiy opposing the motion and draw all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's
favor. Smith, 128 Idaho at 718,918 P.2d at 587 (citingFrielv. Boise City Haus. Auth., 126 Idaho
484, 485, 887 P.2d 29, 30 (1994)). Based on the evidence, if reasonable persons could reach
RESPONDENTS BRIEF ON APPEAL - PAGE
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differing conclusions or draw conflicting inferences, summary judgment must be denied. Id. (citing
Harris v. Department ofHealth and We/fare, 123 Idaho 295,298, 847 P.2d 1156, 1159 (1992)).

However, if the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then summaryjud,gment should
be granted. Id., 128 Idaho at 718-719,918 P.2d at 587-88 (citing Loomis v. City ofHailey, 119 Idaho
434,437, 807 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1991)).
Fmiher, when a defendant moves for summary judgment, asserting there is no genuine issue
of material fact as to an element of a plaintiffs case, the plaintiff "must establish the existence of
an issue of fact regarding that element." Zimmerman v. Volkswagen of4merica, Inc., 128 Idaho 851,
854, 920 P.2d 67, 70 (1996). Moreover, the non-moving paiiy "has the burden of presenting
sufficient evidence to establish a triable issue which arises from the facts, and a genuine issue of fact
is not created by a mere scintilla of evidence." Jarman v. Hale, 122 Idaho 952, 955-956, 842 P.2d
288, 291-292 (Ct. App. 1992) (internal citations omitted). "Ifthemovingpartyfails to challenge an
element or fails to present evidence establishing the absence of genuine issue of material fact on that
element, the burden does not shift to the nomnoving party, and the nonmoving party is not required
to respond with suppo1iing evidence." Smith, supra, 128 Idaho at 719, 918 P.2d at 588 (citing
Thomson, 126 Idaho at 530, 887 P.2d at 1038)). Fmiher, "a nomnoving paiiy's failure to make a

showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that paiiy's case, on which that
party will bear the burden of proof at trial, requires the entry of summary judgment. Jarman, supra,
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122 Idaho at 955-956, 842 P.2d at291-292. (Internal citations omitted). Thus, where the non-moving
party fails, by way of affidavit or deposition, to make a sufficient showing to establish an essential
element to its case, "there can be no 'genuine issue as to any material fact,' since a complete failure
of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other
facts immaterial." Id.
In this matter, Mr. Boswell and Mrs. Boswell failed to meet their burden on sununary
jud,gment, as they failed to make a sufficient showing to establish the existence of the elements of
their claims. The District Court's granting summary judgment to Mary Steele and Amber Steele,
and denial of Mr. Boswell's and Mrs. Boswell's motion for reconsideration must be affinned.

IV. ARGUMENT.
A.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT IDAHO HAS
NEVER ADOPTED STRICT LIABILITY IN DOG BITE CASES.

The District Court properly granted smmnary judgment on the Boswells' strict liability claim,
as the Idaho courts have never adopted or applied strict liability to dog bite or premises liability
cases.
Idaho has only adopted the concept of strict liability in cases dealing with a seller of a
defective product to a consumer. This was set forth in the case of Shields v. Morton Chemical

Company, 95 Idaho 674, 518 P.2d 857 (1974). In that case, this Court adopted a concept of strict
liability in to1is as stated in the Restatement of To1is 2 nd § 402a, which pertained to a seller of a
defective product to a consumer. The seller needs to be engaged in the business of selling the
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product and the product is expected to and does reach the consumer without substantial change in
the condition in which it was sold. See Shields, 95 Idaho at 676, 518 P.2d at 859. While Idaho has
continued to adopt the concept of strict liability, it is has been within the confines of the Restatement
of Tmis 2 nd § 402a concept. Idaho has not adopted strict liability in dog bite cases.
In their opening brief, the Boswells give short shrift to to McClain v. Lev-.1iston Interstate Fair
and Racing Association, 17 Idaho 63, 104 P. 1015 (1909) in suppmi of their position on appeal.
However, McClain does not impose strict liability. In McClain, this Court dealt with two causes
of action, negligence and trespass. In 1909, this Court did not expand the concept of negligence and
trespass 5 to impose strict liability. The Boswells'' argument to the contra1y is an erroneous reading
of the case. The quote on page 79 of the McClain decision must be read in its proper context. That
context puts the quote as follows:
One of the early cases in this country considering the legal principles
involved in the case at bar, under the facts as alleged in the complaint, is that
of Decker v. Gammon, 44 Me. 322, 69 Am. Dec. 99, and in our opinion states
the rule correctly as follows: "If domestic animals, such as oxen and horses,
injure anyone, in person or property, if they are righ(fully in the place where
they do the mischief, the owner of such animals is not liable for such injury,
unless he knew that they were accustomed to do mischief. And in suits for
such injuries, such knowledge must be alleged, and proved. For unless the
owner knew that the beast was vicious, he is not liable. If the owner had such
knowledge he is liable."
"The owner of domestic animals, if they are wrongfully in the place 1-vhere
they do any mischief, is liable for it, though he had no notice that they had

In citing to McClain, Mary ~teele and Amber Steele do not acknowledge, but rather continue to
oppose that they were negligent in any manner, as will be discussed in more detail in the remainder
of this brief. In addition, the Boswells have never asserted any trespass claim.
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been accustomed to do so before. In cases of this kind the ground of the
action is, that the animals were wrongfully in the place where the injury was
done. And it is not necessary to allege or prove any knowledge on the part
of the owner, that they had previously been vicious."
This case clearly draws the distinction between that class of cases cited by
counsel for appellant and that class of cases coming under the allegation of
the complaint in this case. Where it is alleged, as in the case at bar, that the
animal is wrongfully at the place where the mischief is done, the owner is
liable for the damage done, if any, although he had no notice that such animal
possessed the trait or characteristic of doing the particular thing which caused
the injury. The right of action arises by reason of the fact that as against the
plaintiff the animal causing the injury is a trespasser, is unlawfully at the
place where the injury occurs and at which place the plaintiff has a legal right
to be. So in the case at bar the allegations of the complaint are to the effect
that the plaintiff was invited by the fair association to engage in riding a race
upon the grounds controlled by the fair association and at a time when the air
association was conducting its fair, thus clearly showing the plaintiff to be a
licensee upon the racetrack at the time the accident occmTed. Then follow
the allegations that the defendants unlawfullv, wrongfully, negligentlv and
wantonly pennitted the do2 in controversy to go upon, run over such
racetrack and come in contact with the horse ridden bv the plaintiff which
occasioned and caused the injury for which damages are sought. Under these
facts it was not necessary to allege or prove any particular trait or
characteristic of the dog, or that the defendants had knowledge that such dog,
or the class of dogs to which the same belonged, possessed any peculiar trait
or characteristic, or the trait or characteristic which led it to the place and to
do the act which caused the injury. (Decker v. Gammon, 44 Me. 322, 69
Am,. Dec. 99; Chunot v. Larson, 43 Wis. 536, 28 Am. Rep. 567, 2 Cyc. 373;
1 Thompson on Neg., 888.) These authorities seem to be in line with the
reason of the case.
McClain, 17 Idaho at 79-80, 104 P. at 1020-21 [italics in original][underscore supplied].
Ifidaho were adopting a strict liability standard in 1909, this Court certainly would not have
phrased its holding in tenns of the status of the allegations in the complaint which were negligence
and trespass by a dog and its owner. In fact, strict liability was not pled in 1909 in McClain; it was
RESPONDENTS BRIEF ON APPEAL - PAGE
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not the legal theory in 1909, and is not the holding of McClain .. This is clearly indicated when this
Court, in McClain, discussed its holding as opposed to a discussion of the Decker v. Gammon, 44
Me. 322, 69 Am. Dec. 99, case. On pages 81 and 82, this Court issued its true holding in which it
clearly supported that liability in ~McClain is based on theo1ies of negligence and trespass. In that
regard, this Comi stated:
The dog is generally recognized as an essential paii of every well-regulated
family, and of a higher degree of intelligence than other domestic animals,
and given privileges not generally conceded to other members of the animal
family. But we are inclined to the opinion that notwithstanding this fact, and
notwithstanding the fact that the dog occupies a higher position in the social
world of the animal family, and an impo1iant one in human affairs, still that
the owner of such animal should not be excused from liability for injuries
done by the dog when invading the rights of person or property. This
position that the dog has well earned, by reason of his heroic acts and deeds
of valor, might be a reason for exacting from the owner a higher duty as to
responsibility for the dog's acts, but it certainly is not a reason why the owner
of such animal should be not equally responsible for the wrongs done by a
dog as for wrongs done by other domestic animals. And we believe, both
upon reason and authority, that when a dog invades and trespasses upon the
legal rights of a person and injures person or property, and such invasion and
trespass is the result of the negligence of the owner, the owner is liable for the
damages done. Emphasis supplied.
17 Idaho at 81-82. 104 P. at 1021.
Clearly, this Court in McClain did not expand the pleadings of the plaintiff from negligence
and trespass to strict liability. There has been no case cited by the Boswells since McClain to
indicate that this Comi has adopted strict liability in dog bite cases, and this Comi should not do so
here.
The Boswells cite to non-binding treatises for their strained interpretation of McClain as
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holding Idaho allows for strict liability in dog bite cases. Again, the Boswells' position lacks merit.
Again, strict liability was not pled in 1909 in McClain; it was not the legal theory in 1909, and is not
theholdingoftheMcClain comi, as clearly indicated therein,. See, McClain, 17 Idaho at 81-82, 104
P. At 1021. McClain never adopted or applied strict liability to dog bite or premises liability cases.
Fmiher, ifidaho were adopting a strict liability standard in 1909, this Court certainly would not have
phrased its holding in ten11S of the status of the allegations in the complaint which were negligence
and trespass by a dog and its owner. And, again, under the Boswells' en-oneous position, like the
facts in this case, a person could reach their hand into a dog pen, receive a dog bite and then have
no responsibility for their own behavior that initiated the incident. Idaho's to1i system has never
endorsed such lack of personal responsibility. See Idaho Code§ 6-801 et. seq.
Further, as the Boswells fail to provide the Comi with any law in Idaho applying strict
liability in dog bite or premises liability cases, they attempt to deflect from this by citing the Court
to non-binding case law/statutes of other states. It appears the Boswells obtained these citations from
some legal compilation or treatise, and did not carefully read or scrutinize them. Again, the glaring
fact the Boswells cannot escape is that Idaho is not a strict liability state, along with Hawaii,

Kansas, North Dakota (see, Sendelbach v. Grad, 246 N.W. 2d 496, 501 (N.D. 1976) (premises
liability), Vermont and Virginia. Indiana presumes a dog is harmless and applies strict liability

only where a letter carrier is involved. Nevada actually requires two bites in an eighteen
month period, without provocation (N.R.S. 202.500)(2013). Rhode Island only applied strict
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liability if the dog gets out of its enclosure. DuBois v. Quilitzsch, 21 A.3d 375, 380 (R.I. 2011).
Additionally, there are states that require the plaintiff show the owner knows or reasonably knows
the dog is vicious or dangerous, and, of those, South Dakota-Gehrts v. Batteen, 620 N.W. 775, 778
(S.D. 2001) and Tennessee,Fletcherv. Richardson, 603 S.W.2d 734, 735-36 held that the showing

of knowledge was a negligence, not strict liability, theory. In Alaska, summary judgment was
granted to the defendant animal owner, since the plaintiff knew of the animal's dangerous
propensities (Hale v. O'Neill, 492 P.2d 101, 104 (Alaska 1971). New Mexico has a similar law to
Alaska. Smith v. Village ofRuidoso, 994 P.2d 50, 54 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999). Other states held that

provocation, comparative fault and assumption of risk theories applied in such cases (Priebe
v. Nelson, 140 P.3d 848,849 (Cal. 2006);Russo v. Zeigler, 67 A.3d 536 (Del.Sup. Ct. 2013); Dist1ict
of Columbia (D.C. Code§ 8-1902(b)(l)(B); Florida, Fla. Stat. Ann. §767.04 (2013) (comparative
fault applies); VanBeheren v. Bradley, 640 N.E. 2d 664, 666-67 (Ill. Ct. App. 1994); Fouts v. Mason,
592 N.W.2d 33,36 (Iowa 1999); Pepper v. Triplet,864 So. 2d 181, 191-92 (Louisiana2003);Audette

v. Comm., 829 N.E.2d 248, 255 (Mass. 2005); Hill v. Sacka, 666 N.W. 2d 282, 287-88 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2003); Engquist v. Loyas, 803 N.W. 2d 400, 403 (Minn.2011); Nebraska. Rev. Stat. 54601(b)(2013); Bohan v. Ritzo, 679 A.2d 597,601 (N.H. 1996). Neve1iheless, Idaho is not a strict
liability state, and has never recognized strict liability in dog bite cases.
Moreover, the District Comi correctly concluded the Boswells did not cite to any authority

that expressly or implicitly establishes that Idaho has adopted strict liability in dog bite cases.
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Much like the Boswells argued in their prior submissions, they never cited one Idaho case, including
McClain, supra, where strict liability was recognized as a claim in a dog bite or premises liability
case in Idaho. The Boswells asse1ied, both before the District CoUii and this Court, that because
non-binding, treatises and foreign law allow for strict liability(most of which do not supp01i the
Boswells' position, as previously asse1ied), then Idaho is a strict liability state. However, simply
because there may be case law in other jurisdictions does not change the fact that such law is nonbinding auth01ity, and the only authority that is binding is Idaho law. The District CoUii ce1iainly
recognized this, as evidenced by its citation to McClain, as follows:
If domestic animals, such as oxen and horses, injure anyone, in person or
prope1iy, if they are rightfully in the place where they so the mischief, the
owner of such animals is not liable for such injury, unless he knew that
they were accustomed to do mischief. And in suits for such injmies, such
knowledge must be alleged, and proved. For unless the owner knew that the
beast was vicious, he is not liable. If the owner had such knowledge he is
liable. The owner of domestic animals, if they are wrongfully in the place
where they so any mischief, if liable for it, though he has no notice that
they had been accustomed to do so before. In cases of this kind the ground
of the action is, that the animals were wrongfully in the place where the
injury was done. And it is not necessary to allege or prove any knowledge on
the pmi of the owner, that they has previously been vicious.
Where it is alleged, as in the case at bar, that the animal is wrongfully at the
place where the mischief is done, the owner is liable for the damage done, if
any, although he had no notice that such animal possessed the trait or
characteristic of doing the particular thing which caused the injury. The
right of action arises by reason of the fact that as against the plaintiff the
animal causing the injury is a trespasser, is unlawfully at the place where
the injury occurs and at which place the plaintiff has a legal right to be.
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R., pp.461-462. Further, the District Court properly explained how McClain did not establish strict
liability:
It appears to the Court that McClain does not establish recovery based on
strict liability. The question presented in McClain is whether the animal
trespassed or not. If the animal has trespassed, then the owner is strictly
liable. If the animal has not trespassed and is lawfully where it is entitled to
be, then the owner is only liable if they have knowledge of the vicious or
dangerous character of the animal. There is no dispute in the record that
Zoey was 1ightfully in Mary's kitchen. Amber stayed in Mary's home and
Mary consented that Amber could keep Zoey in her home. At the time of the
bite, Zoeywas in the kitchen behind the gate. Furthermore, Plaintiffs cannot
cite to any authority that expressly or implicitly establishes that Idaho has
adopted strict liability in dog bite cases. If Plaintiffs are to recover, it will be
if the Defendants were negligent.

R., p. 462. It was readily apparent to the District Court that Plaintiffs failed to cite to any Idaho law
where strict liability has been adopted in dog bite cases or premises liability cases.

Further, in

denying the Boswells' motion for reconsideration the District Court reasoned that in McClain,
The Court therein clearly did not hold that strict liability is the law in Idaho
in a dog bite case such as the instant action. No Idaho case law in the
subsequent one hundred plus years has been cited as adopting this position
no matter how the law in other states may have developed. It is not the trial
courts[sic] responsibility to move the law beyond that which the Idaho
Supreme Court have [sic] previously detern1ined.
R., p. 484. Thus, it is abundantly clear the Boswells' citations to non-binding case law, treatises and
to the Restatement (Second and Third) of Torts lacks merit. Again, the only time strict liability has
been allowed in Idaho is in products liability cases. See, Shields v. Morton Chemical Company, 95
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Idaho 674,676,518 P.2d 857, 859 (1974). The District Court properly followed Idaho law, which
does not recognize strict liability in cases other than products liability, in granting summary
judgment.
B.

THE DISTRICT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THERE WAS NO GENUINE
ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT THAT MR. BOSWELL \VAS NOT AN
INVITEE.

Mr. Boswell was not an invitee; rather, he was a social guest or licensee, as he rendered an
incidental service to Mary Boswell-he drove her home-and never conferred any monetary, business
or commercial benefit to Mary Steele. A social guest is a licensee, and a guest rende1ing a minor
incidental service to the landowner does not change the guest from being considered a licensee.
Wilson v. Bogart, 81 Idaho 535, 545, 347 P.2d 341, 347 (1959). As a social guest, or licensee, a

landowner is only required to share with the licensee laiowledge ofdangerous conditions or activities
on the land. Evans v. Park, 112 Idaho 400, 401, 732 P.2d 369, 370 (Ct. App. 1987)(emphasis
supplied). Additionally, the Supreme Court has held that the fact that a guest may be rendering a
minor incidental service to the host does not change the relationship between them as landowner and
a licensee. Wilson, 81 Idaho at 545,347 P.2d at 347. See also, Mooney v. Robinson, 93 Idaho 676,
471 P.2d 63 (1970).
In this case it is undisputed Mr. Boswell was Ms. Steele's son-in-law. R., p. 184 (Mary
Steele Depo., p. 6, 11.7-9). It is undisputed Mr. Boswell was taking Ms. Steele home after a family
gathering. R., p. 217 ( Stephen Boswell Depo., p.23, 1.17-p.24, 1.23). It is fmiher undisputed neither
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Ms. Steele nor Mr. Boswell were conferring upon each other any economic benefit; rather Mr.
Boswell was a "family member" who took Mary. Steele to and from her home for a family gathering.
R.,p. 239 (Karena Boswell Depo., p.48, 1.4-p. 50, 1.15). This is exactly what this Court in Wilson
contemplated as a social guest. Mr. Boswell was not receiving any remuneration. Ms. Steele was
not conducting any business on her property. Thus, the District Comi conectly concluded that Mr.
Boswell was a social guest/licensee.
C.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE
BOS\VELLS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE ELEMENTS OF THEIR
NEGLIGENCE AND NEGLIGENCE PER SE CLAIMS.

1.

The record shows the Boswells failed to establish each element of their common
law negligence claim.

For a valid claim of negligence, a plaintiffmust show (1) a duty, recognized bylaw, requiring
the defendant to confonn to a ce1iain standard of conduct; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal
com1ection between the defendant's conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage.

Boots v. Winters, 145 Idaho 389, 392, 179 P.3d 352, 355 (Ct. App. 2008)(citing, Nation v. State,
Dept of Corrections, 144 Idaho 177, 189, 158 P.3d 953,965 (2007)). The Boswells failed to meet
their burden, and have not disputed that Mary Steele put up warning signs; that she and Amber Steele
did not know Zoey to be dangerous or vicious; that prior to the incident, there had been no
complaints or any adjudication that Zoey was dangerous or had bitten anyone without provocation;
that Zoey nipped at a Chris Kettler, but only because Zoey saw Ms. Kettler reach or move towards
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Amber Steele and was being protective of her; that Mary Steele and Amber Steele never saw Zoey
bear her teeth, snarl or lunge at someone; that Mary Steele had a fenced-in back yard to keep Zoey
on her prope1ty; that Zoey stayed in the basement or was behind the gate in the kitchen, where she
was at the time of the incident.
Further, the Boswells do not dispute that Mr. Boswell, on his own, and without Mary's

knowledge or her at her request, approached Zoey, ·who was behind the gate, with his right
hand in a closed fist. R., 219 (Stephen Boswell Depo., p. 29, 1.7-p. 33, 1.5). Mr. Boswell reached
to Zoey and she bit him. The Boswells do not dispute Mr. Boswell admitted that there was no reason
for him to go beyond the gate, and that Mary Steele never asked him to go to Zoey, and he decided
on his own to go to Zoey. R., p. 184 ( Mary Steele Depo., p. 12; p. 40, 11. 14-18; R., p.218 (Stephen
Boswell Depa. p. 25, 11.22-24).
Even more telling is that the Boswells admitted that they knew that Mary Steele and

Amber Steele kept Zoey in the basement, and did not think Mary did anything wrong in
keeping Zoey in a fenced in back yard or behind the gate in her house. R., p. 220 (Stephen
Boswell Depo., p. 34, 1.24-p. 35, 1.1; R., 232 &238(KarenaBoswell Depo., p. 19, 11.2-6; p. 42, 1.10-p.
43, 1.3). Mrs. Boswell admitted after the bite, she still was around Zoey and did not have any
concerns, could not say Zoey's conduct was predictable and could not be critical of Mary Steele's
actions. R., p. 232, 236, 238( Karena Boswell Depo., p. 17, 11. 19-23; p. 33, 11. 1-8; p. 42, 1.1 0-p.43,
1.3).
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The District Comi conectly concluded that Mr. Boswell was a social guest, not an invitee.
R., 465-66; 484, 485. In its decisions, the District Court c01Tectly outlined the elements of
negligence, citing to Boots v. Winters, 145 Idaho 389,392, 179 P.3d 352,355 (Ct. App. 2008). R.,p.
465. The District Comi then, properly, stated "the Boswells failed to establish that Mary Steele had
a recognizable duty to Mr. Boswell." R., p. 465. The District Comi then, as it properly should have,
discussed the issue of premises liability, in relation to the duties owed to an invitee and licensee. R.,
p. 465-66. What the Boswells fail to recognize is that premises liability is a fonn of negligence, and
the duty owed is detennined on the status of the person entering the premises, i.e. invitee, to whom
the owner owes a duty to keep the premises safe and warn of hidden or concealed dangers and
licensee, or social guest, to whom a landlord only owes a duty to disclose known dangerous
conditions or activities on the land. The District Comi went through this analysis, citing to Bates
v. EIRMC, 114 Idaho 252,253, 755 P.2d 1290, 1291 (1988), Wilson v. Bogert, 81 Idaho 535,545,

347 P.2d 341, 347 (1959) and Pincock v. McCoy, 48 Idaho 227, 281 P.2d 371 (1929), and
detennined, based on the undisputed facts in the record, that Mr. Boswell was not an invitee, but a
licensee or social guest, as he was not confening any business, commercial or monetary or other
tangible benefit to Mary Steele. R.,466. The District Court then went on to properly detennine that
as the Boswells failed to establish evidence that Mary Steele breached her duty, as the record was
undisputed that Zoey was behind a gate in the kitchen, in an enclosed area, where she was supposed
to be, and it was Mr. Boswell who approached Zoey, on his own accord, putting his closed fist to
Zoey and was bitten. R., p. 466. In denying the Boswells' motion for reconsideration, the Dist1ict
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Court con-ectly and succinctly stated the Boswells failed to meet their burden in establishing
negligence, reasoning:
Although Defendants knew of the prior bites by the dog, they also knew of
the circumstances of these bites and were not on notice that they were
harboring a dangerous animal. In addition, the injuries received by the
Plaintiff occun-ed as the result of his approaching the dog which was behind
a closed gate. Plaintiffs actions were a proximate cause of his own injuries.

R., p. 487. Again, the record clearly shows the Boswells failed to meet their burden on summary
judgment, and that the District Comi properly granted summary judgment to Mary Steele and Amber
Steele.
2.

The Boswells failed to meet the elements of their negligence per se claims.

The Boswells asserted negligence per sepursuant to Pocatello City Code 6.04.050 and Idaho
Code §25-2805. On both of those matters, the Boswells failed to meet each element to establish
their negligence per se claims, thereby entitling Mary Steele and Amber Steele to summary
judgment.
As the District Court stated in its decision, to establish a claim for negligence per se, a
plaintiff must show that:(1) the statute or regulation clearly defines the required standard of conduct;
(2) that the statute or regulation is intended to prevent the type of hann the defendant's act or
omission caused; (3) the plaintiff is a member of the class of persons the statute or regulation was
designed to protect; and (4) the violation was the proximate cause of the injury. R., p. 485( citing
Jones v. Starnes, 150 Idaho 257,262,245 P.3d 1009, 1014 (2011); 0 'Guin v. Bingham County, 142
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Idaho 49, 52, 122 P.3d 308, 311 (2005); Ahles v. Tabor, 136 Idaho 393, 395, 34 P.3d 1076, 1078
(2001).
Pocatello City Code 6.04.050 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
A. Dangerous Conduct By Animal Prohibited: The owner or custodian of any
animal which commits any of the acts defined in this chapter as "dangerous"
may be cited for a misdemeanor and the animal control depmiment may
seize and impound the animal until the matter has been adjudicated. The
conduct shall not be deemed dangerous if the victim (person, domestic
animal, or livestock) was committing a tort against the animal's
owner/custodian, or committing a trespass or other tort on the premises of the
animal's owner/custodian. Specifically prohibited are the following acts:
1. If unprovoked by teasing, taunting, or a threatening manner by any
person, approaching said person in an apparent attitude of attack upon the
streets, sidewalks, public grounds or places, common areas within
subdivisions or mobile home or recreational vehicle parks, common grounds
of apartment buildings, condominiums, or townhouse developments, or
private property not solely owned or possessed by the owner or custodian of
the animal; or
2. Biting, inflicting injmy, assaulting, or otherwise attacking a human being
or domestic c animal or livestock without justifiable provocation.
B. Prohibited Animals: No person may own or harbor or have custodial care
of any of the following types of vicious animals:
1. Any animal with a known propensity, tendency, or disposition to
attack unprovoked, to cause injury, or to otherwise endanger the safety of
human beings or domestic animals or livestock, unless restrained and/or
confined as provided in section 6.04.060 of this chapter[ ... ]
E. Owner Liability: An adult owner/custodian of a dangerous animal shall be
liable for all injuries and prope1iy damage sustained by any person or by any
animal caused by an unprovoked attack by any dangerous animal, plus
all costs, civil judgments or penalties, c1iminal fines, final tenns, veterinary
fees, shelter impound fees, and any other penalties and orders.[Emphasis
supplied].
Pocatello City Ordinance 6.04.060 sets f01ih restraint requirements, stating that, "[t]he
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owner/custodian of any animal convicted of a violation of the dangerous conduct prohibitions set
out in this chapter shall complete the requirements of this subsection and subsection B .... "
Sections 6.04.050A and B provide that a person cannot harbor a dangerous animal only after an
animal is "adjudicated" as dangerous. Further, this is supp01ied by the language of section 6.04.060
mandates restraint of a dangerous animal where "the owner/custodian of any animal convicted of
a violation of the dangerous conduct prohibitions .... " [Emphasis supplied].
Likewise, LC. §25-2805 provides that a vicious dog is a dog, "which, when not physically
provoked, physically attacks, wounds, bites or otherwise injures any person who is not trespassing

. . . . " and that, "[p]ersons guilty of a violation of this subsection . . . shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor." [Emphasis supplied].
The District Court found the Pocatello City Code failed to comply with the first prong of the
negligence per se analysis, which requires that the "regulation clearly defines the required standard
of conduct." Deficient in the code were definitions of what constitutes "provocation" or what
"threatening manner by any person" means. R., p. 486. Thus, the Boswells' reliance on the city
code is faulty and that aspect of their negligence per se claim was properly dismissed.
Additionally, the District Court properly noted that the record was void of any facts showing
Amber Steele or Mary Steele knew Zoey was vicious or dangerous or that the attack was
unprovoked. This compo1is with the aforementioned codes and statute. Sections 6.04.050A and B
provide that a person cannot harbor a dangerous animal only after an animal is "adjudicated" as
dangerous.

Fmiher, section 6.05.060 mandates restraint of a dangerous animal where "the
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owner/custodian of any animal [is] convicted of a violation of the dangerous conduct

prohibitions .... " Likewise, §25-2805 provides that a vicious dog is a dog, "which, when not
physically provoked, physically attacks, wounds, bites or otherwise injures any person who is not
trespassing .... " and that, "[p ]ersons guilty of a violation of this subsection ... shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor." [Emphasis supplied]. Again, there was no factual dispute that there had been no
adjudication that Zoey was found to be dangerous or vicious. Further, Mr. Boswell admitted, on his
own, and without telling Mary, he approached Zoey, with a closed fist, and put his closed fist to her
face. This certainly qualifies as provocation, thereby negating any basis for Plaintiffs' negligence
per se claims, which the District Court properly recognized as undisputed.
Furihennore, the District Court found that the fourth prong of the negligence per se analysis,
that the violation was the proximate cause of the injury, was not met by the Boswells. Again, as the
record unequivocally shows, Mr. Boswell approached Zoey, extended his ann beyond the gate that
enclosed her in the kitchen and it was his conduct that was the proximate cause of his injury. R., p.
486. It cmmot be overstated that Mr. Boswell admitted, on his own, and without telling Mary, he
approached Zoey, with a closed fist (despite attempting to contradict this testimony in his
inadmissible affidavit), and put his closed fist to her face. R., 219-20 (Stephen Boswell Depo. p. 29,

1.7-p. 33, 1.5)
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Additionally, the Boswells' argument that the District Comi should have addressed nonbinding decisions from other jurisdictions lack merit. Again, those decisions are non-binding, and
not consistent with Idaho law. Thus, the District Court c01Tectly granted summary judgment and this
Court should affinn that decision.

3.

There is no private cause of action under Idaho Code § 25-2805 or Pocatello
City Codes §§ 6.04.050 and 6.04.060.

It is patently obvious, in reviewing the city codes and Idaho statute asse1ied by the Boswells
there is no plivate cause of action, either express or implied. "When a statute is silent regarding
p1ivate enforcement, courts may recognize a p1ivate right only when it is necessary to assure
effectiveness of the statute." Foster v. Shore Club Lodge, Inc., 127 Idaho 921, 908 P.2d 1228
(1995); White v. UnigardMut. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 94, 101, 730 P.2d 1014, 1021 (1986)). Likewise,
this Court has held that there was no private cause of action for an insured who sought to sue its
insurer under criminal statutes for obstruction of justice, bribery and corrupt influences, reasoning
that those statutes were not designed to protect any special class of persons, only the general public,
and that there was no legislative intent to create a private cause of action through those statutes.

Yoakumv.HartfordFirelns. Co., 129Idaho 171,176,923 P.2d416,421 (1996). It is clear that a
private cause of action is unnecessary to give effect to §§ 25-2805 or Pocatello City Codes §§
6.04.050 and 6.04.060. Those statutes do not establish any right of the Boswells, either express or
implied, and are expressly limited to criminal sanctions. The Boswells" attempt to invoke a private
right under the statutes is an attempt to asse1i a criminal statute in a civil action, which was expressly
prohibited by the Court in Yoakum, supra. If the Idaho legislature or Pocatello City wanted to
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provide for a private cause of action tlu·ough Idaho Code § 25-2805 and Pocatello City Codes
§§6.04.050 and 6.04.060, they could have expressly provided for civil remedies, but only set fo1ih
criminal remedies. As a result, since those statutes do not provide for a private cause of action, the
Court should find this as an additional basis for dismissal of the Boswells' claims.

D.

THERE IS NO FACTUAL DISPUTE THAT AMBER STEELE DID NOT
OWN THE PROPERTY WHERE THE INCIDENT OCCURRED, AND
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRt\NTED TO HER.

The Boswells have not put fmih any facts disputing Amber Steele was not an owner of the
premises where the incident occmTed. They also fail to cite to any case law contrary to the case law
cited by Amber Steele that only a landowner owes a duty to a person entering the premises, subject
to the person's status as an invitee, licensee or trespasser. See, supra, at 18-19. As Amber Steele
did not own the premises, summary judgment was properly granted to her.

E.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED THE AFFIDAVIT OF
TAMARA ANDERSEN.

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56fe) provides, in pe1iinent paii, as follows:
Suppmiing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge,
shall set fo1ih such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show
affinnatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated
therein.
Additionally, Idaho Rule of Evidence 401 provides:
"Relevant Evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the detern1ination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
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Rule 402 provides:
All relevant evidence is admissible except as otherwise provided by these
rules or by other rules applicable in the couiis of this state. Evidence which
is not relevant is not admissible.
Rule 404 provides:
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait
of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that the person acted
in confom1ity therewith on a paiiicular occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pe1iinent trait of the accused's
character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same;
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim
of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same,
or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the
prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first
aggressor;
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided
in Rules 607, 608 and 609.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts
is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the
person acted in confom1ity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for
other purposes, such as proof of motive, oppo1iunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that
the prosecution in a criminal case shall file and serve notice reasonably in
advance of trial, or during trial if the comi excuses pretrial notice on good
cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it intends to
introduce at trial.
Fuiiher, as to testimony of witnesses, lay and expert testimony "is governed by the rules of
evidence regarding the opinion testimony oflaywitnesses and experts under Idaho Rules ofEvidence
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701 and 702." I.R.E. 702 provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to dete1mine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expe1i by knowledge, skill, expeiience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the fonn of an opinion or otherwise.

However, expert testimony that is based on speculation, is not admissible under Rule 702.
Speculation, as it relates to expe1i testimony is defined as "the art of theoiizing about a matter as to
which evidence is not sufficient for certain knowledge." Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho 561, 564, 97
P .3d 428, 432 (2004).
An expert opinion that is speculative or unsubstantiated by facts in the record
is inadmissible because it would not assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or detennine a fact that is at issue. Expert opinion that merely
suggests possibilities would only invite conjecture and may be properly
excluded."

Id. [Emphasis added] [Internal citations omitted]. See also Jones v. Crawforth, 147 Idaho 11,205
P .3d 660 (2009) (expert opinions are only admissible if they assist the trier of fact in understanding
the evidence or detennining an issue of fact); Weeks v. E. Idaho Health Servs., 143 Idaho 834,838,
153 P .3d 1180, 1184 (2007) (expert opinion that is speculative, conclusory or unsubstantiated by
facts in the record does not assist the jury and is inadmissible).
Ms. Andersen's affidavit was conclusory, lacked foundation and was based on speculation.
R., pp. 78-80. For example, in paragraph 11, Ms. Andersen failed to provide any foundation as to
her conclusion what a "previous bite" was. R., p. 79. Fmiher, in paragraph 12, Ms. Andersen's
statement is based on her unfounded premise Amber Steele was not honest with her, which is a
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credibility issue for a jury to decide, not something to which Ms. Andersen can provide testimony.
R.,p. 79. See, State v. Pany, 150 Idaho 209, 229, 245 P .3d 961, 981 (2010). The avennent was also
based on speculation and should be stricken. Fmiher, paragraphs 13-1 7 were based on pure
speculation. R., pp. 79-80. Ms. Andersen never examined or conducted any personal evaluation
of Zoey, and, in essence, she tried to say that Zoey had the propensity or habit of biting people,
without foundation, which led to Mr. Boswell's being bitten, which violates Idaho Rule of Evidence
404. Ms. Andersen apparently did not supplement her affidavit, as after she submitted it, she could
have read the deposition of Mr. Boswell, who admitted he approached and reached over to Zoey
with a closed fist. Thus, Ms. Andersen's opinions lacked foundation and were conclusory. The
District Court c01Tectly concluded that such opinions were conclusory, reasoning that Ms. Andersen
failed to make any additional study of Zoey' s behavior or other witnesses, as well as her "unfounded
conclusion that Amber 'lied' to her at the time of the incident." R., pp. 465-66.

F.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY QUASHED THE DEPOSITION
SUBPOENA OF JOHN BILLQUIST.

Mr. Billquist, a fonner adjuster for Mary Steele's and Amber Steele's insurer, State Fann,
never made a witness of himself. Rather, Mr. Billquist \Vrote a letter to the Boswells' attorney, in
response to their settlement demand. Thus, the letter he sent was not admissible pursuant to Idaho
Rule of Evidence 408, which prohibits the admission of settlement discussions. It states:
Evidence of (I) furnishing, offering, or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting,
offering, or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising
or attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity
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or amount, is not admissible to prove liability for, invalidity of, or amount of
the claim or any other claim. Evidence of conduct or statements made in
compromise negotiations is likewise not admissible. This rule does not
require the exclusion of any evidence otherwise discoverable merely because
it is presented in the course of compromise negotiations. This rule does not
require exclusion if the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as
proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of undue
delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.
Compromise negotiations encompass mediation.
At the hearing on July 16, 2013, the District Comi concluded that Mr. Billquist could not be
deposed about the letter, citing the Court's holding from Dabestani v. Bellus, 131 Idaho 542, 961
P.2d. 633 (1998), which precluded the disclosure, under the work product privilege, of an adjuster's
statement of another party. Tr., p. 10. Further, Mr. Billquist' s letter was a settlement discussion, as
clearly, the first paii of the letter stated, "This letter is in response to your demand of August 29,
2012. R., 77. I.R.E. expressly prohibits the letter and Mr. Billquist's deposition.
Additionally, there was no waiver of any attorney client or work product privilege as the
Boswells' argue. While not cited by the Boswells in their opening brief on appeal, below, they cited
to Skelton v. Spencer, 98 Idaho 417,420,565 P.2d 1374, 1377 (1977), where this Comi cited to the
U.S. Supreme Comi, Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 US 464, 470-71 (1888), for the well-settled principle
that the attorney client privilege "is that of the client alone .... "

Additionally, Idaho Rule of

Evidence 502(c) also specifically provides that only the client may asse1i the privilege:
Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the client or
for the client through the client's lawyer, the guardian or conservator, or by
the personal representative of a deceased client, or the successor, trustee, or
similar representative of a corporation, association, or other organization,
whether or not in existence. The person who was the lawyer or the lawyer's
representative at the time of the communication may claim the privilege but
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only on behalf of the client. The authority of the lawyer or lawyer's
representative to do so is presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
Furthem1ore, Idaho Rule of Evidence 510, related to waiver of privilege by voluntary
disclosure provides that the holder of the privilege waives such privilege when the holder
"voluntarily discloses or consents to disclosure of any significant paii of the matter or
communication."
In this matter, the Boswells have not provided any evidence establishing that Mary Steele or
Amber Steele waived the attorney client or work product privileges. The District Court previously
and correctly found that the work product privilege set forth in Dabestani, barred the deposition of
Mr. Billquist, and his letter in no way was a waiver of any privilege. Fmiher, Mr. Billquist was not
a witness, and had no personal knowledge of the Chris Kettler incident. Ultimately, the District
Court c01Tectly found that the record clearly showed that neither privilege had been waived.

G.

AMBER STEELE AND MARY STEELE, NOT THE Bos,vELLS, ARE
ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL.

Amber Steele and Mary Steele are entitled to attorney's fees and costs under Idaho Code§
12-121 and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41. In addition, Idaho Code § 12-121 and I.A.R. 41 allow
for the award of attorney's fees and costs in a civil action where a matter was defended frivolously,
unreasonably and without foundation. Hogg v. Wolske, 142 Idaho 549,559, 130 P.3d 1087, 1097
(2006). Additionally, I.A.R. 40 allows for the award of costs to the prevailing pmiy on appeal.

It is patently clear the Boswells have pursued their claims fiivolously, unreasonably and
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without foundation. The law is well settled that there is no strict liability in dog bite cases in Idaho,
and the record is abundantly clear that the Boswells failed to meet their burden of establishing their
negligence, negligence per se and premises liability claims. Based upon the aforementioned statute
and rules, as well as I.A.R. 40, No1ihwest is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs on
appeal.

V. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Defendants/Respondents Amber Steele and Mary Steele request that
the Comi affinn the District Cami's grant of summary judgment to them, dismissing
Plaintiffs/Appellants Stephen Boswell's and Karina Boswell's claims, in their entirety, with
prejudice. Defendants/Respondents fmiher request the Comi award them their attorney's fees and
costs on appeal.
DATED this.d.7day of September, 2014.
COOPER & LARSEN CHARTERED
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2j_ day of September, 2014, I served a true and c01Tect
copy of the above and foregoing document to the following person(s) as follows:
Kent Higgins
Merrill & Me1Till, Chtd.
PO BOX 991
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991

RESPONDENTS

BRIEF ON APPEAL - PAGE 34

n[ ]
[]
[]

U.S. Mail/Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivery
Overnight Mail
Facsimile/ 232-2499

